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INTRODUCTION
In #LivingWhileBlack: Blackness as Nuisance, Taja-Nia Henderson and
Jamila Jefferson-Jones examine incidents wherein white people called
911 to report Black people for occupying spaces that callers believed the
Black people in question ought not to occupy.1 Sadly, these incidents
*

Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor of Law, University
Distinguished Professor and Inaugural Robert G. Storey Distinguished Faculty Fellow,
SMU Dedman School of Law. Ph.D., LLM with Distinction, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University. J.D., University of California, Los Angeles. A.B., Princeton University.
1. Taja-Nia Y. Henderson & Jamila Jefferson-Jones, #LivingWhileBlack: Blackness as
Nuisance, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 863, 863 (2020). The phenomenon of white people calling
the police or personally accosting Black people based on unfounded allegations of
wrongdoing has also been described as “white caller crime,” an ironic reference to white
collar crime. See Chan Tov McNamarah, White Caller Crime: Racialized Police Communication
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are consistent with the seemingly never-ending instances of vigilante
and police detentions, assaults, and killings of Black people who find
themselves charged with running afoul of formal legal norms and, just
as often, informal, unarticulated norms that seem to apply only to
Black people. Such incidents cross class and gender lines, as Black
people from all walks of life seem at all times prone to being summarily
judged and even executed by agents of the state or by self-deputized
private citizens. Few news cycles go by without such an incident coming
to light, and those incidents are vested with meanings even beyond
their immediate impact, as media representations of the events are
systematically “constructed, crafted, curated and circulated.”2 In one
recent case in May 2020, a white woman called the police on a Black
man in a semi-wild section of Central Park in New York after he asked
her to follow park rules and keep her dog leashed.3 The woman
refused and falsely claimed during the call that the man, an avid bird
watcher, had threatened her life.4 Video of the incident revealed the
woman’s falsehood and sparked widespread anger.5 In February 2020,
a young Black man, Ahmaud Arbery, was chased down, shot, and killed
by white men who claimed that he resembled a suspect in neighborhood

and Existing While Black, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 335 (2019). Though McNamarah
treats a topic similar to that addressed by Henderson and Jefferson-Jones in their
article, McNamarah takes a different approach, framing the problem as “a systematic
phenomenon” of “racialized police communication.” McNamarah borrows the phrase
“white caller crime” from author Michael Harriot. See Michael Harriot, ‘White Caller Crime’:
The Worst Wypipo Police Calls of All Time, ROOT (May 15, 2018, 9:30 AM),
https://www.theroot.com/white-caller-crime-the-worst-wypipo-police-calls-of-1826023382.
2. GAVAN TITLEY, RACISM AND MEDIA 36 (2019).
3. Sarah Maslin Nir, The Bird Watcher, that Incident and His Feelings on the Woman’s
Fate, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/nyregion
/amy-cooper-christian-central-park-video.html.
4. Id.
5. As author Taja-Nia Henderson observed in an interview, many people were angry
because the incident raised memories of the Central Park Five, five young Black and Latino
men who were wrongfully convicted of raping a white woman jogger in Central Park in
1989. Nikita Stewart, The White Dog Walker and #LivingWhileBlack in New York City, N.Y. TIMES
(May 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30 /nyregion/central-parkvideo.html. The woman, Amy Cooper, was charged with filing a false report, a
misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in jail. Jan Ransom, Amy Cooper Faces Charges After
Calling Police on Black Bird-Watcher, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/07/06/nyregion/amy-cooper-false-report-charge.html.
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burglaries.6 The unfortunate young man was apparently only out for a jog
and was scarcely a block from his home.7 Arbery’s killing was a reminder
of the distinctly racialized, spatialized, and surveillance legacy of jogging.8
It has, like so many other such incidents, been captured with a hashtag:
#IRunWithMaud.9
The COVID-19 crisis,10 a global pandemic that reached the United
States in early 2020 and remains a public health crisis as of the
publication of this Article, has also given birth to yet new instances in
which Black people are harangued and harassed for being present in
public places. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Black people have been
targeted for being present in public without masks or for other alleged
violations of recently established, frequently changing, sometimes
ambiguous, and unevenly enforced public health norms.11 For instance,
the New York Times reported recently that of the forty people arrested in
Brooklyn for violating social-distancing rules between March 17 and May
4, 2020,12 thirty-five were Black, four were Hispanic, and one was white.13

6. Russ Bynum & Kate Brumback, White Father, Son Charged with Murder in Ahmaud
Arbery Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 8, 2020), http://www.apnews.com/b1abc55058e
7e6aa8cf8f8084681097e.
7. Id.
8. See Natalia Mehlman Petrzela, Jogging Has Always Excluded Black People, N.Y. TIMES
(May 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/12/opinion/running-joggingrace-ahmaud-arbery.html (“[T]he most enduring legacy of the racialized experience of
recreational running is the surveillance and suspicion to which Black people have long
been subjected.”).
9. Jacey Fortin, On Ahmaud Arbery’s Birthday, Thousands Say #IRunWithMaud, N.Y.
TIMES (May 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/08/us/run-with-maudahmaud-arbery.html (last updated May 11, 2020).
10. COVID-19 is a highly infectious viral illness that can cause a respiratory tract
infection and broader systemic damage. Its symptoms range from mild sickness to death.
See Symptoms of Coronavirus, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/symptoms-testing/symptoms.html. (last visited August 4, 2020).
11. Ashley Southall, Scrutiny of Social-Distance Policing as 35 of 40 Arrested Are Black,
N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/07/nyregion/nypdsocial-distancing-race-coronavirus.html (last updated May 13, 2020). Over one-third of
the arrests were made in the predominantly Black Brownsville section of Brooklyn,
while no arrests were made in the whiter Park Slope area of Brooklyn. Id.
12. Social distancing is a practice that has emerged to help slow the spread of
COVID-19, requiring people to stay at least six feet from each other and avoid
gathering in large groups or crowded places. Social Distancing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/preventgetting-sick/social-distancing.html [https://perma.cc/NU5C-LSLU].
13. Southall, supra note 11.
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Some Blacks were beaten and otherwise assaulted in the encounters.14
In contrast, there were widespread images of New York City police
moving among clusters of whites sitting outside closely together in
Williamsburg, Long Island City, and Lower Manhattan without charging
anyone.15 Some officers even offered masks to these groups of whites,
moving on when they declined.16 Police behavior in the COVID-19 crisis
is a reminder of a famous adage about the metaphoric spatial functioning
of law: there must be in-groups whom the law protects but does not
bind, alongside out-groups whom the law binds but does not protect.17
In most of these #LivingWhileBlack cases (#LWB for short),18
Henderson and Jefferson-Jones note, the reporting against Black
people targeted men, women, and even children who had the right to
be present and to engage in the activities for which they were reported
or accosted.19 At other times, the reported activity violated some minor
aspect of the civil or criminal law.20 What unites many of these #LWB
incidents is that the public often only became aware of incidents because
of the almost ubiquitous presence of cellphone camera videos.21 The
uploading and sharing of videos documenting many of the incidents
via social media allowed what would have otherwise been hidden to
become “viral.”22 Digital images, sometimes grainy, often taken from

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. This assertion is often credited to political scientist Francis M. Wilhoit. It is in
keeping with what is broadly understood about the spatial metaphoric functioning of
law and legal geography. See Lolita Buckner Inniss, From Space-Off to Represented Space:
A Review of Reimagining Equality: Stories of Gender, Race, and Finding Home by Anita Hill,
28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 138, 148–49 (2013). The categories that people use
to describe their perceptions of social or other realities are often processed via spatial
cognitive models called schemata. Id. at 148. Some examples are near versus far, inside
versus outside, or center versus periphery. Id.
18. Living While Black is a sardonic reference to perhaps the best known while
Black incident: driving while Black, or DWB. Driving while Black is a description of
racial profiling of Black automobile drivers who are stopped by law enforcement for
real or imagined traffic violations largely because of their race. See infra note 27.
19. Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 1, at 870 n.29, 913 n.287.
20. Id. at 879–80.
21. Id. at 867, 869.
22. This use of social media to garner support for causes has sometimes been
called “slacktivism,” largely because some people have discounted the commitment
required to repost hashtags or posts. See, e.g., Linda S. Greene, Lolita Buckner Inniss
& Bridget J. Crawford with Mehrsa Baradaran, Noa Ben-Asher, I. Bennett Capers,
Osamudia R. James & Keisha Lindsay, Talking About Black Lives Matter and #MeToo, 34
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curious perspectives and angles, have acted as “white witnesses,” offering
confirmatory testimony to the treatment of Black people.23
This type of “sousveillance”—that is, looking back at the lookers—helps
to expose the extent to which anti-Black racism, an issue that has too often
been assumed to belong to the past, persists as a part of United States law
and culture.24 The widespread nature of these incidents garnered a
number of hashtags, among them: #LWB. This particular hashtag is
reminiscent of other “while Black,” or “WB,” incidents.25 While Black
incidents are a particular expression of racial profiling, “a process in
which police officers [or others] use ‘race as a [key] factor in deciding
who to place under suspicion and/or surveillance.’”26
Both #LWB and other WB incidents focus on the performance of a
particular activity and, in most such incidents, Black people who have
been stopped by police or security forces for engaging in all sorts of
activities in which they have a right to engage, such as driving or shopping.27
WIS. J. LAW, GENDER & SOC’Y 109, 175 (2019) (suggesting that research needs to focus
on the concept of slacktivism to increase participation in social movements beyond
just a retweet).
23. See Lolita Buckner Inniss, Video Surveillance as White Witnesses, AIN’T I A FEMINIST
LEGAL SCHOLAR TOO? (Sept. 30, 2012), https://innissfls.blogspot.com/2012/09/
video-surveillance-as-white-witnesses.html [https://perma.cc/CQ75-TL97] (noting
that video surveillance sometimes provides much-needed valorization for less-regarded
members of society such as Black people, and functions much like the historic “white
witness” requirement for people of color to make claims against white people in much
of the United States); see also Bennett Capers, Video as Text/Archive, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND HUMANITIES 790 (Simon Stern et al. eds., 2019) (arguing that
sousveillance often validates the reality of racism).
24. “Sousveillance is the observation or recording of an activity from the
perspective of a participant in the activity. The term also refers to the recording or
monitoring of real or apparent authority figures by others, particularly those who are
generally the subject of surveillance.” Buckner Inniss, supra note 23.
25. I describe while Black, or WB incidents, as “any disparate treatment of Black
people by persons with authority or under color of authority.” Lolita Buckner Inniss,
Help Me Please Chase Away the WB’s, AIN’T I A FEMINIST LEGAL SCHOLAR TOO? (June 6,
2013), https://innissfls.blogspot.com/2013/06/help-me-please-chase-away-wbs.html
[https://perma.cc/8VNT-KBPG].
26. Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 129 (2017) (quoting
Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 13, 1999), https://new
republic.com/article/63137/suspect-policy [https://perma.cc/V2XM-Z53V]).
27. One of the best known of the WBs is driving while Black, DWB, the phenomenon
whereby Black people are stopped more frequently by police than white people or
persons of other races for real or imaginary minor infractions. See David A. Harris, The
Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265,
268–69 (1999). DWB is itself a mocking reference to DWI, a common abbreviation for
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#LWB, as Henderson and Jefferson-Jones frame it, takes an all-too-familiar
problem and offers a startling proposition: the ways in which agents of
the state and private citizens have responded to the presence of Black
people in some instances suggest that Black people, in their very
embodiment or presence, act as undesirable “sensational subjects” and
thus may constitute a nuisance.28
Henderson and Jefferson-Jones approach their claim by first looking
at how the language of nuisance and a sometimes-related concept, trespass
to land, are deployed or “weaponized” to counter Black presence.29 Next,
they look at the historical roots of Blackness as nuisance.30 Finally, they
consider the racial entitlements, implicit or explicit, in #LWB incidents.31 I
agree with the authors that, given the ways in which the very presence
of Black people has been treated in both law and society, it is fruitful
to view Blackness as a perverse form of nuisance and, in some instances,
the actual traffic violation of driving while intoxicated. See Adero S. Jernigan, Driving
While Black: Racial Profiling in America, 24 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 127, 129–30 (2000) (stating
that racial profiling often leads to automobile stops on highways, a concept known widely
in Black communities as “driving while Black”); Anthony E. Mucchetti, Driving While
Brown: A Proposal for Ending Racial Profiling in Emerging Latino Communities, 8 HARV. LATINO
L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) (recognizing that “driving while brown” is a phenomenon similar to
“driving while Black” that specifically affects Latino communities); Ironically, as one
scholar has recently noted, while Black people driving has long raised issues of potential
peril, it has also long been a source of freedom and independence. See GRETCHEN SORIN,
DRIVING WHILE BLACK: AFRICAN AMERICAN TRAVEL AND THE ROAD TO CIVIL RIGHTS 35–36
(2020); see also Katheryn K. Russell, “Driving While Black”: Corollary Phenomena and
Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717, 717 (1999) (focusing on the increasing
criminal consequences faced by Black people, particularly as a result of the DWB
phenomenon). Another while black instance is shopping while Black (SWB), where
Black people are followed or harassed in retail stores or accused of shoplifting. SWB
often has other features, such as “closely monitoring, questioning, searching, and
detaining” Black customers with the suspicion, however thinly supported, of criminal
activity such as shoplifting and credit card or check fraud. TRACI PARKER, DEPARTMENT
STORES AND THE BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT: WORKERS, CONSUMERS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS
FROM THE 1930S TO THE 1980S 233 (2019). I have described my own WB incident, RWB—
being accosted by security forces while attending the reunion of my elite undergraduate
school. See Buckner Inniss, supra note 25.
28. See Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 1, at 897 (explaining how
nuisance claims against Black people have stretched as far back as the years following
the Reconstruction); see also JOHN JERVIS, SENSATIONAL SUBJECTS: THE DRAMATIZATION
OF EXPERIENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD 48 (2015) (arguing that the power of sensation
and spectacle comes both from presentational and rhetorical aspects; thus, bodies that
appear to convey race or gender shape both such discourses).
29. Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 1, at 872.
30. Id. at 897–98.
31. Id. at 905–06.
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trespass to land. This framing is especially in keeping with the way that
both United States nuisance law and the peripherally-related trespass
law have been understood over the last century and a half.32 Henderson
and Jefferson-Jones’ article is a part of the larger discussion that explains
how legal spatial norms like nuisance and trespass combine with norms
of surveillance to create deficiencies in Black access to legal rights and
civic membership.33
I. NUISANCE, TRESPASS, AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE TWO
As Henderson and Jefferson-Jones acknowledge, the #LWB scenarios
they describe do not “neatly fit” into the elements of traditional common
law nuisance claims.34 As the authors show, a large number of #LWB
claims are at least initially framed as claims that fit the traditional
elements of public nuisance.35 Still others incorporate norms of private
nuisance, and yet others seem to allude to private trespass to land
norms.36 At times, claimants in a single #LWB situation move between
the norms of public nuisance, private nuisance, and trespass to land,
rendering already dubious claims of white grievance premised on Black
presence or behavior even more confusing. Part of the crux of Henderson
and Jefferson-Jones’ article is that this sometimes-risible amalgamation of
legal geographic claims by whites against Blacks is worth understanding
given how such incidents deploy old, often arcane laws as vehicles for
the legal enactment of invidious discrimination.37
Before addressing the opacity of the legal doctrine of nuisance, it is
worth pointing out that the word “nuisance” has a significant non-legal
valence that often colors the way in which it is understood in legal decisions.
Nuisance in the lay sense refers to a person, thing, or circumstance that
causes harm or injury or is unpleasant, obnoxious, or annoying.38 This nonlegal definition is clearly related to the legal context, and is but one

32. Id. at 872.
33. See SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS 9
(2015) (arguing that Blackness is “a key site through which surveillance is practiced,
narrated, and enacted”).
34. Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 1, at 873.
35. See id. (explaining how 911 callers targeting Black people in public spaces
typically frame their complaints in terms of public nuisance by claiming an affront to
the “collective peace, safety, comfort, [and] convenience”).
36. See id. at 873 n.43, 888.
37. See id. at 863.
38. Nuisance, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
nuisance [https://perma.cc/E3H4-US8Q].
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example of where non-legal, social meanings blend with legal contexts
and normative analysis.39 The idea of Black people being “bothersome,”
“vexing,” “annoying,” or “harmful” to white people is one that has circulated
since the antebellum period and has persisted well after. Such claims were
often closely tied to concerns that Black people were non-compliant with
white orders, were too assertive, failed to offer sufficient labor value, or were
too loud or visible.40 These notions are at the heart of segregation and other
39. For a historic look at the interplay of social and legal norms of nuisance, see,
for example, Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance
Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101 (1986); Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law
and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403 (1974); John P.S. McLaren, Nuisance
Law and the Industrial Revolution—Some Lessons from Social History, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 155 (1983). For a more general discussion of what some scholars have called the
“law-and-norms school,” see Robert Weisberg, Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms
of Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 468 (2003). Some of the
fundamental tenets of the law-and-norms school are that “social actors are governed
less by formal laws than by patterns of behavior which have accrued normative, if not
obligatory force” and that “norms often govern in a manner indifferent to legal rules.”
Id. Henderson and Jefferson-Jones allude to cases where white plaintiffs sued under
theories of private nuisance where the claims were often premised on little more than
objection to Black presence. Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 1, at 898 (citing
Rachel D. Godsil, Race Nuisance: The Politics of Law in the Jim Crow Era, 105 MICH. L. REV.
505, 507 (2006)) (discussing 19th century cases where efforts were made to limit Black
presence).
40. Consider, for example, some contexts in which non-compliant enslaved or
liberated Black people were often described as “nuisance” causing, “bothersome” or
“troublesome” to white people, and the extent to which physical distancing or removal
was used as a remedy. See S. S. NICHOLAS, CONSERVATIVE ESSAYS: LEGAL AND POLITICAL
ser. 2, at 30 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865) (describing plans for the potential
exile of freed Blacks in order to rid the country of the “negro nuisance”); see also 1
ROBERT EMMETT CURRAN, THE BICENTENNIAL HISTORY OF GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY: FROM
ACADEMY TO UNIVERSITY: 1789–1889 119 (1993) (discussing the sale of individual
enslaved people in order to punish “troublesome slaves”); JOHN WILLIAM GRAVES,
TOWN AND COUNTRY: RACE RELATIONS IN AN URBAN-RURAL CONTEXT, ARKANSAS, 1865–
1905 151 (1990) (discussing the rationale for a proposed law creating segregated train
seating for Arkansas Blacks and decrying the “negro nuisance” on railroads); JOHN C.
INSCOE & GORDON B. MCKINNEY, THE HEART OF CONFEDERATE APPALACHIA: WESTERN
NORTH CAROLINA IN THE CIVIL WAR 225 (2000) (describing disposal of “troublesome
slaves” as the Civil War waned and fears grew that enslaved people would be liberated);
Edmund Ruffin, The Free Negro Nuisance and How to Abate It, SOUTH, July 2, 1858,
reprinted in 1 EDMUND RUFFIN, THE DIARY OF EDMUND RUFFIN app. C at 622–26 (William
K. Scarborough ed., 1972) (arguing for removing from Virginia “all free negros who, as
such, are nuisances in their neighborhood and a detriment to the Commonwealth”);
JOSEPH STURGE & THOMAS HARVEY, THE WEST INDIES IN 1837: BEING THE JOURNAL OF A VISIT
TO ANTIGUA, MONTSERRAT, DOMINICA, ST. LUCIA, BARBADOS, AND JAMAICA: UNDERTAKEN
FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASCERTAINING THE ACTUAL CONDITION OF THE NEGRO POPULATION
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apartheid-like mechanisms, both de facto and de jure, that have kept
Blacks and whites apart in numerous contexts for centuries.41 Allegations
of “Black nuisance” in the non-legal sense have frequently merged into
claims about legal nuisance and have included relatively minor claims
about bothersome Black body odor,42 noisy “negro church” presence,43 or
housing for “aged people in good health . . . [and] children of the negro
race.”44 Such claims have also been premised on more pernicious and
THOSE ISLANDS 216 (London, Hamilton, Adams, & Co. 1838) (describing the
management of “troublesome negros”); JOHN J. ZABORNEY, SLAVES FOR HIRE: RENTING
ENSLAVED LABORERS IN ANTEBELLUM VIRGINIA 101 (2012) (discussing disposing of
“troublesome slaves” by hiring them out to a coal pit); Diary Entry of Tennessee Keys
Embree (Sept. 8, 1867, in TANDEM LIVES: THE FRONTIER TEXAS DIARIES OF HENRIETTA
BAKER EMBREE AND TENNESSEE KEYS EMBREE, 1856–1884 257 (Amy L. Wink ed., 2008)
(recounting one of the authors, a white woman, being “vexed” by recently freed Blacks
who “are so set up that they dislike to do any thing for the white race”).
41. See, e.g., GRAVES, supra note 40, at 151.
42. See Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, Bicentennial Man—The New Millennium Assimilationism
and the Foreigner Among Us, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1101, 1112 n.64 (2002) (“Americans have
long asserted that foreigners and other racial and ethnic outsiders smelled.”).
43. Spencer Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church v. Brogan, 231 P. 1074, 1075
(Okla. 1924). In Spencer Chapel, Black defendants who owned a Black church appealed
and overturned a lower court finding that rebuilding their church would constitute a
nuisance, even though “[t]he negro is of a social and religious nature” and “[t]heir
social gatherings are usually at the church.” Id. at 1076. Key factors in the win were
that the neighborhood was already largely Black, and the white plaintiff bought his
property with his “eyes open.” Id. Thus, the court ruled, the white plaintiff would not
be permitted “to change what was a negro community at the time the original church
was built, and for a long time thereafter, into a white community for the purpose of
increasing the salable value of their property.” Id. Though the Black defendants
prevailed in this case, this outcome reads much like the white plaintiff did not prevail
because he effectively “came to the nuisance.” “Coming to the nuisance” is a traditional
defense to claims of nuisance where a defendant can show that he or she engaged in
the offending activity with similar results before the plaintiff moved to the
neighborhood. See, e.g., Donald Wittman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of
“Coming to the Nuisance”, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 557, 557 (1980).
44. City Council v. United Negroes Protective Ass’n, 230 P. 598, 599 (Colo. 1924)
(affirming a lower court judgment that required the City Council to issue a permit to
the builders of a home for Black orphans and the healthy elderly). Although the court
upheld a finding that the proposed building did not constitute either a threat to public
health or a nuisance, it noted that “[t]he locality where it is proposed to erect and
maintain this institution is congested. Heavy traffic, over railroads and in trucks, passes
through it. Business of various kinds, manufacturing, industrial, and commercial, is
carried on there” and “[m]any negroes live in the neighborhood.” Id. There was, thus,
also a “coming to the nuisance” element to the finding, and an implicit suggestion that
the neighborhood was already undesirable for more “decent” (read: white) uses. See
id. For a further discussion of race, place, and nuisance law, see Vicki Been with Francis
OF
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broad assertions about Black criminality and dangerousness.45 In all such
instances, non-legal understandings about Black people as nuisance were
often conflated with the legal doctrine of nuisance.
But even discounting the interplay of lay understandings of nuisance
with legal norms, defining legal nuisance has never been easy. As one
court wrote at the end of the nineteenth century, “[I]t would tax the
acumen of the wisest body of lawmakers to describe with particularity
every act the doing of which, in our complicated civilization, would
constitute a nuisance.”46 Part of the complexity stems from the fact that

Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of
Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1997). See Vicki Been, Locally
Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market
Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1384, 1406 (1994) (examining the claim of the
environmental justice movement that the siting of locally undesirable land uses has
been carried out in a racist and classist manner).
45. See Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 1, at 885 (quoting Rose Hackman,
Swimming While Black: The Legacy of Segregated Public Pools Lives on, GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2015,
12:41 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/04/black-children-swim
ming-drownings-segregation [https://perma.cc/W7TX-GL8W]) (discussing “white
fear” that was “created around a mythology of dangerous, hypersexual [B]lack men and
vulnerable, precious white women in need of protection”); see also Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Wendell E.
Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent
Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 47 (2003)) (second alteration in original) (stating
that “[u]rban renewal projects have long been associated with the displacement of
[B]lacks” and that “[i]n cities across the country, urban renewal came to be known as
‘Negro removal’“). Justice Thomas further remarks that “[o]ver 97 percent of the
individuals forcibly removed from their homes by the ‘slum-clearance’ project upheld
by this Court in Berman were [B]lack.” Id. (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30
(1954)). See Lolita Bucker Inniss, A Domestic Right of Return?: Race, Rights, and Residency
in New Orleans in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 325, 335,
351 (2007), for a discussion of how Black Hurricane Katrina survivors were
dispossessed and displaced in New Orleans due to broad white belief in a Black racecrime nexus and how Black separation that was first implemented via ghettoization
was later carried out via “urban renewal” or “negro removal.” The notion of Blacks as
nuisance was seen in the postbellum adoption of stringent Black codes that kept Blacks
off of streets and out of entire towns and states. See CHERYL JANIFER LAROCHE, FREE
BLACK COMMUNITIES AND THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD: THE GEOGRAPHY OF RESISTANCE
117–18 (2013); see also Brandi T. Summers, What Black America Knows About Quarantine,
N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/opinion/sunday
/coronavirus-ahmaud-arbery-race.html (“The American state has restricted [B]lack
people’s mobility at least since the time of slavery. These regulations included convict
leasing, Black Codes, loitering laws, redlining, racial zoning, . . . and increased
surveillance.”).
46. People v. Lee, 40 P. 754, 755 (Cal. 1895).
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modern nuisance law may be separated into three distinct categories,
all of which share some common doctrinal history and are frequently
confused.47 Though similar in some respects, there are vital differences
among the three.
A private nuisance claim is an action brought by a private plaintiff
that asserts that a defendant’s nontrespassory use of his personal
property interferes with the plaintiff’s enjoyment of his own property.48
In opposition to private nuisance is public nuisance. A public nuisance
is an unreasonable interference with the public’s right to property.49
Unlike its private counterpart, public nuisance claims often include
conduct that interferes with public health, safety, peace, or convenience.50
Such claims are typically brought by a public (governmental) plaintiff.51
Existing between private and public nuisance is a hybrid form of nuisance
that involves a private plaintiff who brings a claim for interference with
public rights. These private plaintiffs, according to the traditional doctrine,
must demonstrate some recognized type of “special,” “particular,” or
“peculiar” harm.52 Central to such inquiries is the reasonableness of the
alleged nuisance-doer’s behavior, “which varies from case to case and is
highly fact-specific.”53 Regardless of modern classification, all nuisance
claims relate to, but still remain distinct from, trespass to land suits.

47. Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special
Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 765 (2001).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (Am. Law Inst. 1979) (“A private
nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment
of land.”).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1979) (“A public
nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.”).
50. Id. § 821B(2)(a).
51. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *167 (“Common nuisances are a
species of offenses against the public order and economical regimen of the state; being
either the doing of a thing to the annoyance of all the king’s subjects, or the neglecting
to do a thing which the common good requires.”); see also William A. McRae, Jr., The
Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. FLA. L. REV. 27, 36 (1948)
(discussing the evolution of private nuisance from the English Crown’s right of public
nuisance claims).
52. Antolini, supra note 47, at 766 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 821C(1)) (“In order to recover damages in an individual action for a public nuisance,
one must have suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of
the public exercising the right common to the general public that was the subject of
interference.”).
53. Lolita Buckner Inniss, Back to the Future: Is Form-Based Code an Efficacious Tool for
Shaping Modern Civic Life?, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 75, 82 (2007).
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When lay people, and even many law-trained people, hear the word
trespass, they immediately envision a harm having to do with real
property. It bears noting, however, that at common law there were
several forms of trespass, chief among them trespass to chattels and
trespass to land. Trespass to chattels is defined as “dispossessing another
of the chattel” or “using or intermeddling with a chattel in the
possession of another.”54 Traditionally, courts applied trespass to chattels
in cases of intentional intermeddling with another’s personal property
or in cases of dispossession short of conversion.55 Trespass to chattels
requires actual harm and does not give nominal damages.56 In contrast,
trespass to land at common law occurs when a person physically enters
the lands of another without an invitation, license, or lawful authority
to do so and once there causes damage to the lands or to the title in the
lands.57 A trespass to land claim requires a defendant’s entry to be both
“wrongful,” and “intentional”; as a result, mere unauthorized and
intentional interference or presence alone, without fault, has
traditionally been sufficient to support such a claim.58 Unlike nuisance,
trespass to land does not require harm caused.59
Though trespass to land and nuisance have increasingly been viewed
as similar, such as where courts reject any distinction between trespass
to land and nuisance based on whether an invasion to land is tangible
and direct versus intangible and indirect, many courts have retained
distinctions between the two.60 At the center of these distinctions is one
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217.
55. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14, at 87
(5th ed. 1984).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 13.
58. See Avihay Dorfman & Assaf Jacob, The Fault of Trespass, UNIV. OF TORONTO L.J.,
Winter 2015, at 48, 51–52 (2015) (asserting that the property tort of trespass to land
“formally belongs in the class of intentional wrongs” and has traditionally been viewed
as a strict liability wrong).
59. See id. at 53–54 (noting that there is an “otherwise unusual commitment on the
part of courts to find trespass and to grant appropriate relief even in cases where
boundary crossings are no more than trifling inconveniences or, indeed, harmless”).
60. See, e.g., Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 635 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (W.D.
Wash. 1986) (maintaining that although the Washington Supreme Court has rejected
distinctions between trespass and nuisance based on an invasion’s directness or
tangibility, the court continues to recognize a distinction based on the nature of the
interest being interfered with); see also Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546,
550 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Fagerlie v. City of Willmar, 435 N.W.2d 641, 644
n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)) (“[A]lthough some of the traditional distinctions between
nuisance and trespass have become blurred and uncertain, the distinction now
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concerning the nature of the interest with which a particular invasion
interferes. As one court described it, “If the intrusion interferes with the
right to exclusive possession of property, the law of trespass applies. If the
intrusion is to the interest in use and enjoyment of property, the law of
nuisance applies.”61 The non-physical/physical dichotomy between nuisance
and trespass continues to give shape and coherence to the two doctrines.
II. #LWB INCIDENTS AS LEGAL GEOGRAPHY: RACE AND SPACE
The interaction between various forms of nuisance and trespass to land
norms are part of the discussion of legal geography.62 Legal geography is
an aspect of law that concerns itself with spatial issues in law.63 This
includes contemporary real property norms such as zoning and planning.64
Legal geography also encompasses common law norms such as servitudes,
nuisance, and trespass, especially in the context of contemporary reconsiderations of historic real property issues.65 There is a large amount of
accepted is that trespass is an invasion of the plaintiff’s right to exercise exclusive
possession of the land and nuisance is an interference with the plaintiff’s use and
enjoyment of the land.”); Burke v. Briggs, 571 A.2d 296, 298 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1990) (contending that the blurring of the distinction between nuisance and trespass
has led to difficult to explain outcomes).
61. Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979).
62. See generally THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE (Nicholas
Blomley et al. eds., 2001) (exploring the relationship between law and geography and
illustrating the value of geographical perspective to the theory and practice of law).
63. See Lolita Buckner Inniss, “Other Spaces” in Legal Pedagogy, 28 HARV. J. ON RACIAL
& ETHNIC JUST. 67, 75 (2012) (“Often the fundamental questions of legal geography
concern themselves with the fact that in law, as in geography, ‘space’ is sometimes
contested, contingent, or otherwise at issue.”). A more nuanced exploration of legal
geography is seen with critical legal geography (CLG). CLG methodology involves
“exploring the ways in which geographic assumptions and unequal spatialization of
power constitute and are constituted by law.” Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of “Moo
Ha Ha”: A Tribute to Keith Aoki’s Role in Developing Critical Legal Geography, 90 OR. L. REV.
1233, 1239 (2012). Moreover, CLG scholarship “rejects the belief that law reflects any
preexisting or natural division of people or place and argues that law and space are
mutually and inexorably generative of each other.” Jacquelyn Amour Jampolsky,
Property, Sovereignty, and Governable Spaces, 34 LAW & INEQ. 87, 91–92 (2016). See generally
DAVID DELANEY, THE SPATIAL, THE LEGAL AND THE PRAGMATICS OF WORLD-MAKING:
NOMOSPHERIC INVESTIGATIONS (2010) (describing the intersection of socio-legal and
critical geographic scholarship as a theoretical framework for critical legal geography).
64. See Buckner Inniss, supra note 63, at 75 (indicating other spatial legal rules that
mediate attachments to physical territory such as the creation of urban and suburban
areas and migration across national and sub-national borders).
65. Geremy Forman & Alexandre Kedar, Colonialism, Colonization, and Land Law in
Mandate Palestine: The Zor al-Zarqa and Barrat Qisarya Land Disputes in Historical
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literature on these more material aspects of legal geography.66 Much of
this work addresses the role that race plays in legal formulations and
determinations.67 What are less common, however, are discussions of
common law or modern administrative law legal geographic norms that are
contorted or corrupted in the service of implementing racism. This is
where Henderson and Jefferson-Jones’ article achieves its greatest
purchase.
One notion the article makes clear in situations involving #LWB
claims is that actual formal claims of nuisance are not typically brought
nor are they typically supportable.68 Rather, the white claimants’ attempt
to engage the law’s force to terminate activities that Blacks undertake
would scarcely withstand legal or social scrutiny.69 Consider the case of
“BBQ Becky” that Henderson and Jefferson-Jones describe.70 BBQ

Perspective, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 491, 493–94 (2003) (discussing the ways in
which legal geography offers elucidation for both contemporary and historic
geographic norms).
66. Buckner Inniss, supra note 63, at 75–76.
67. See, e.g., A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 120–22 (1996) (highlighting how when
cities used zoning ordinances to segregate street blocks only to have these ordinances
subsequently challenged and struck down, courts overturned these ordinances solely
out of concern for white property owners); see also Richard Thompson Ford, The
Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1874–75
(1994) (addressing the role of municipalities and other local government actors in
creating racially identifiable spaces); Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1047, 1081–89 (1996) (describing the use of zoning and redevelopment power
by municipalities to isolate communities along lines of race or socioeconomic status);
Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the Policing of
Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540, 1542–43 (2012) (arguing
that concerted efforts of welfare and criminal policing institutions, together with
private actors, restrict the housing choices of poor Black women and function in ways
that are analogous to the formally repudiated racially restrictive covenant).
68. Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 1, at 902, 905.
69. See id. at 882–84.
70. Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 1, at 873–75. The nickname “Becky”
is increasingly appended to white women whose officious, overzealous, often racist,
and classist behavior harms Black people or other people of color. The rise in
characterizations of white women as Becky(s) is a modern phenomenon, related to
but different from past characterizations, such as Miss Ann. Both Miss Ann, a nickname
for violent, harmful white woman enslavers in the antebellum period, and Becky
characters foment violence against Black people. See Cheryl E. Matias, Becky(s) as
Violent, in SURVIVING BECKY(S): PEDAGOGIES FOR DECONSTRUCTING WHITENESS AND
GENDER 191, 193 (Cheryl E. Matias ed. 2019). Compare Karen, a pejorative nickname
for entitled, self-focused white women who demand accountability from supervisors
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Becky is the pejorative nickname given to Jennifer Schulte, a white
woman who called police in Oakland, California to report a group of
Black people who were allegedly using a charcoal grill where such use
was not permitted.71 Schulte informed the 911 dispatcher that the usage
had to be addressed immediately “so that coals don’t burn more
children and we have to pay more taxes.”72 As Henderson and JeffersonJones note, Schulte frames herself as hero and victim, despite the fact
that some eyewitnesses described Schulte as the harasser.73 This
framing, interestingly, fails the basic framework for a privately-brought
public nuisance claim in that Schulte alleged no “special” or “particular”
harm to herself from the allegedly public act of nuisance. Instead, she
claimed to be vindicating the public’s right to be safe from burning
coals and increased taxes.74 When police failed to respond after
Schulte’s first call, she turned to framing the use of the charcoal grill
as a matter of private nuisance and alleged that the park was her private
property and that she could thus exclude the users of the grill.75 At this
point, Henderson and Jefferson-Jones note Schulte was alleging that
the grillers were committing trespass to land.76
Schulte’s pivot from a nuisance-like claim to a trespass-like claim is
perhaps not surprising. Despite historical distinctions, modern usage
has increasingly confused trespass to land and nuisance.77 However,
the confusion or overlap between these two property torts generally
(“I want to speak to your manager”) and who sometimes, intentionally or not, harm
others, especially people of color or less privileged people. See Kaitlyn Tiffany, How
‘Karen’ Became a Coronavirus Villain, ATLANTIC (May 6, 2020) (quoting Sarah Miller, My
so-Karen Life, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/07
/style/its-karentown.html),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/05/coronavirus-karen-memesreddit-twitter-carolyn-goodman/611104 (describing Karens as “‘the policewomen of all
human behavior,’ using the example of a suburban white woman who calls the cops on
kids’ pool parties”).
71. Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 1, at 873–74; BBQ Becky: Woman
Photoshopped into Black History After Barbecue Complaint, BBC NEWS (May 18, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-44167760 [https://perma.cc/QZ5M-5FE7].
72. Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 1, at 874.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 875.
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., Adams v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 219–20 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1999) (explaining how some courts have granted plaintiffs a recovery in trespass
to land for intangible invasions of their property, which would typically fall under the
tort of private nuisance).
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occurs in the context of private nuisance and trespass.78 Private
nuisance, in contrast to trespass to land, is an interference with the use
and enjoyment of land and does not require interference with the
possession of land.79 What is unusual in Schulte’s case is that she pivots
between private assertion of a public nuisance and private assertion of
a trespass, which is a tort involving private interests. To summarize, it
is as if she is saying in her nuisance claim, “I (as a private person) need
to vindicate the rights of the polity (to which I, but not you, belong) in
this park.” Her trespass claim can be summarized as, “I (as a private
person) have property rights in this park; you have none, so I may
exclude you.” Neither facts nor law could support either claim. Instead,
Schulte seems to rely upon a heady mix of anti-Black racism and false
indignation to fuel her claims.
Henderson and Jefferson-Jones relate Schulte to “Permit Patty,”80 a
pejorative nickname given to Alison Ettel. Ettel, a white woman, called
78. Id.
79. See Edwin A. Skoch, Personal Injury Liability Coverage for Environmental
Contamination Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy: Is Migrating Pollution a
“Wrongful Entry or Eviction or Other Invasion of the Right of Private Occupancy”?, 9 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 37, 48 (1995).
80. Here, the nickname given to Ettel likely stems from the humorous effects of
alliteration and the desire to call Ettel “out of her name” using a stereotypically “white”
name. This is seen elsewhere, such as infra note 85, which discusses “Coupon Carl.”
Patty is also, however, an old pejorative name for white people, one possibly growing
out of the word “pattyroller” or “patterroller”—a corruption of “patrollers,” who were
publicly- or privately-engaged whites who pursued escaped slaves in the antebellum
period. See KENNETH C. DAVIS, IN THE SHADOW OF LIBERTY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
SLAVERY, FOUR PRESIDENTS, AND FIVE BLACK LIVES 56–57 (2016) (exploring the history
of “pattyrollers”). The term was captured in a little-referenced, offensively-worded, and
darkly-themed Black folk song called “Run, Nigger Run.” Some of the lines are:
Run, nigger, run; de patter-roller catch you;
Run, nigger, run, it’s almost day.
Run, nigger, run, de patter-roller catch you;
Run, nigger, run, and try to get away.
Dis nigger run, he run his best,
Stuck his head in a hornet’s nest,
Jumped de fence, and run fru de paster;
White man run, but nigger run faster.
DOROTHY SCARBOROUGH & OLA LEE GULLEDGE, ON THE TRAIL OF NEGRO FOLK-SONGS 24
(1925). Filmmaker Jordan Peele makes a not-so-veiled allusion to this song in his film
“Get Out,” where he plays the 1939 British song “Run, Rabbit, Run” during a scene
where a white assailant pursues and captures a Black victim. GET OUT (Universal

2020]

RACE, SPACE, AND SURVEILLANCE

229

the police on an eight-year-old Black child selling bottled water on the
public sidewalk in front of the San Francisco building where both
lived.81 Ettel took issue with the alleged illegality of the child’s actions,
the child’s lack of a sales permit, and the child’s supposed trespassing
onto Ettel’s property.82 The sidewalk area did not in fact belong to
either the complainant or to the alleged violator.83 As Henderson and
Jefferson-Jones note, Ettel seemed to make first a private law claim
(trespass), which she later tried to frame as a public nuisance action to
vindicate public rights (she asserted that the child’s voice was loud and
disruptive).84 Once again, like Schulte, Ettel lurches between making a
public nuisance and a private trespass claim in a situation where race
was likely the substantial motivation for her behavior. Throughout
their article, Henderson and Jefferson-Jones recount numerous cases
of Black people who were victimized by #LWB incidents while sleeping
in one’s own dormitory, visiting communal pools as residents or guests,
and conducting business in retail stores.85 The authors also discuss some
of the historic aspects of #LWB.86 Surveillance is a past and ongoing
aspect of #LWB incidents.
III. #LIVINGWHILEBLACK AND SURVEILLANCE
Though Henderson and Jefferson-Jones only hint at it in their
article, #LWB incidents (and other while Black incidents) feature both
literal and figurative surveillance.87 Much contemporary analysis of

Pictures 2017). “Run, Rabbit, Run” is believed to be a sanitized and deracinated version
of “Run, Nigger Run.” See Jennifer Ryan-Bryant, The Cinematic Rhetorics of Lynching in
Jordan Peele’s Get Out, 53 J. POPULAR CULTURE 92, 97 (2020).
81. Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 1, at 875–76; Jessica Campisi et al.,
After Internet Mockery, ‘Permit Patty’ Resigns as CEO of Cannabis-Products Company, CNN
(June 26, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/25/us/permit-patty-san-franciscotrnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/W5HM-DH4J].
82. Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 1, at 875–76.
83. Id. at 876.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 882–83, 886–91. Here the authors discuss the case of Morry Matson
(dubbed “Coupon Carl”), a white retail manager in Chicago who called the police on
Camilla Hudson, a Black woman who attempted to use a manufacturer’s coupon for
her purchases. Matson first claimed to be “intimidated” by Hudson, then, after asking
her to leave the store, framed his claim largely in trespass to land norms. Id. at 890.
86. Id. at 898–904.
87. See BRANDI THOMPSON SUMMERS, BLACK IN PLACE: THE SPATIAL AESTHETICS OF
RACE IN A POST-CHOCOLATE CITY 153–56 (2019) (“Surveillance is practiced, narrated,
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surveillance often centers on “high tech” surveillance methods such as
security video and police body cameras.88 However, the question of
“low tech,” more conventional surveillance also figures significantly in
such incidents.89 It has long been understood in scholarly domains that
there is power inherent in watching people as a form of control.90
Outsiders, like Blacks and women, are often at the center of state-based
and private low-tech watching, listening, following, and monitoring
programs. Frequently, these surveillance schemes are meant to control
Black people’s presence, their work, and the extent to which they engage
in the “appropriate” racial behaviors as “Good Negroes.”91 Those Black
people who participate in cross-racial interactions or avail themselves
of other “white” aspects of daily life, some quite mundane, ranging
from attending college to using discount coupons, violate these norms.
In the context of civic membership, complex mythologies about
behavior and presence form the terrain of Black people’s oppression
and frame #LWB incidents. In the “panoptic” or “watcher” regime,
there is no clear dichotomy between the public and the private sphere,
for the two are fused, confused, and otherwise conflated to serve white
desire to retain power over space. This merger, of the public and the
private, of the inside and the outside, expressed via the operation of
panoptic norms, has particular applicability to the situation involving
#LWB incidents.
and enacted through Blackness, and surveillance is similarly structured by racism and
antiblackness.”).
88. Greene et al., supra note 22, at 175.
89. Id.
90. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 34 (Miran Božovič ed., 1995) (“It
is obvious that, in all these instances, the more constantly the persons to be inspected
are under the eyes of the persons who should inspect them, the more perfectly will the
purpose of the establishment have been attained.”).
91. The “Good Negro,” sometimes known as a sambo figure, is a historic trope
about the “ideal” Black person who interacts with whites. It is not merely an individual
characterization or description, but rather part of a broader societal ideal that
valorized the subservient, obedient Black who embraced white supremacy and thereby
enabled the white capitalist, imperialist project. “As a socially constructed category
sambo was part of the racialised taxonomy of transcultural colonial subjection that
enabled the machinery of imperialism, racial capitalism and white European settler
colonialism to function.” SHIRLEY ANNE TATE, DECOLONISING SAMBO: TRANSCULTURATION,
FUNGIBILITY AND BLACK AND PEOPLE OF COLOUR FUTURITY 4 (2020). In the context of the
United States, the sambo figure was seen as “docile but irresponsible, loyal but lazy,
humble but chronically given to lying and stealing; his behavior was full of infantile
silliness and his talk inflated with childish exaggeration.” STANLEY M. ELKINS, SLAVERY:
A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE 82 (3d ed. 1976).
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CONCLUSION
In making their case about Blackness as nuisance, Henderson and
Jefferson-Jones offer a meaningful addition to existing literature.
While following on some scholarship in the area of property, their
article is clearly distinct in that it adopts existing normative ideas about
the nature of both nuisance and trespass and deploys them in shaping
the parameters of an important new analytical and descriptive idea:
Blackness is more than just a racial description; it is sometimes
perversely deployed as a property tort. The article also raises an
implicit point that is little discussed in other literature: the presumed
innocence and normalcy of white guilt and the presumed guilt and
deviance of Black innocence.92 This discourse posits the harmlessness
of whiteness in parallel with the dangerousness of Blackness.93 In
almost all of the incidents described, there is an assumption that the
only Black people worthy of vindication in such matters are those who
can show, categorically, that they are not only not guilty of the claims
made against them but are additionally not guilty of anything at all.
This is part of the reason that media accounts often excavate any criminal
or civil violations of Black victims in such matters, notwithstanding the
complete irrelevance of such information.94
92. See DARIUS PRIER, THE MEDIA WAR ON BLACK MALE YOUTH IN URBAN EDUCATION
67–68 (2017) (comparing the media’s disparate and imbalanced treatment in
representation of Black male youth as compared to their white counterparts).
93. Id. For a discussion of the possibilities for Black innocence, see ROBERT REIDPHARR, ONCE YOU GO BLACK: CHOICE, DESIRE, AND THE BLACK AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL
131 (2007).
94. Consider, for example, how footage showing slain jogger Ahmaud Arbery
looking around the inside of a construction site before his killing was widely shown in
media accounts and implicitly used to suggest that he was somehow engaged in
trespass or even theft. Richard Fausset, What We Know About the Shooting Death of Ahmaud
Arbery, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/ahmaud-arberyshooting-georgia.html. The owner of the home under construction later weighed in,
stating that he himself never reported Arbery’s presence and that nothing had been
stolen from the site. Tony Thomas, Homeowner Doesn’t Believe Ahmaud Arbery Stole
Anything Before Shooting, WSB-TV ATLANTA, https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/home
owner-doesnt-believe-ahmaud-arbery-stole-anything-before-his-death/ZRBC7TH4OZ
BGBH6UVIVHE3D7BE [https://perma.cc/5EJV-3LJB] (last updated May 13, 2020,
6:44 AM). Consider also the recent killing of George Floyd, a Black man detained by
Minneapolis police on allegations of using a counterfeit bill and then killed when a
detaining officer knelt on Floyd’s neck until he died. Floyd’s death was recorded by a
bystander. Christine Hauser et al., ‘I Can’t Breathe’: 4 Minneapolis Officers Fired After Black
Man Dies in Custody, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/05/26/us/minneapolis-police-man-died.html. Several subsequent articles
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Henderson and Jefferson-Jones observe that there are some moves
afoot to obtain relief from #LWB incidents, including federal, state,
and local calls for redress.95 Such initiatives are likely to raise awareness
of the problem. But how, they indicate, can Black victims of white
callers ever prove that they were the victims of bias, given the absence
of proof that plagues many such matters? One way, the authors note,
is to intervene with 911 dispatchers and first responders to educate
them on the nature of #LWB incidents.96 This might include training
dispatchers and first responders so they have an appreciation for the
problem and are able to provide productive advice or guidance. It could
also include outsourcing police work.97 As Henderson and Jefferson-Jones
cogently note, “racialized territoriality and entitlements to space and place”
are at the heart of the problem.98 What remains, then, is to redefine the
performances that shape the production of norms pertaining to race and
space and to thereby broaden the class of people with power to define what,
or who, is in or out of place.99
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budgets and reallocating those funds to social services, health, or education. Id.
Disbanding or abolishing police would mean reimagining the role of police by
eliminating some of the more militarized aspects of their practices such as no-knock
warrants and military-style raids. Id.
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Fourth Amendment applies to law enforcement activity carried out by private actors. See
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